Anti-Corruption Foundation
The Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF; Russian: Фонд борьбы с коррупцией (ФБК), romanized: Fond borby s korruptsiyey, FBK; lit. 'Foundation for combating corruption') is a non-profit organisation established in 2011 by the Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny. The FBK published investigations into alleged corruption by high-ranking Russian government officials. The organisation is funded by private donations. On 9 October 2019, the FBK was declared a "foreign agent" by the Russian Ministry of Justice. On 9 June 2021, the FBK was designated as an "extremist" organisation and liquidated by the Moscow City Court. On 11 July 2022, while imprisoned, Navalny announced the relaunch of the FBK as an international organisation. On 27 November 2025, the Russian Supreme Court designated the FBK as a "terrorist organisation". The European Court of Human Rights and Amnesty International have condemned the Russian Federation's legal actions against ACF and Alexei Navalny, like the designations as "foreign agent", "extremist" and "terrorist", deeming them as politically motivated trial and political and unlawful persecutions.
Фонд борьбы с коррупцией | |
.svg) Logo since 2022 | |
| Abbreviation |
|
|---|---|
| Formation | 2011 |
| Founder | Alexei Navalny |
| Dissolved | 9 June 2021 (in Russia) |
| Type | NGO |
| Purpose | Anti-corruption |
Chairwoman of the Board of Directors | Maria Pevchikh, since 22 March 2023[1] |
| Website | fbk.info |
| This article is part of a series on |
| Liberalism in Russia |
|---|
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The Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF; Russian: Фонд борьбы с коррупцией (ФБК), romanized: Fond borby s korruptsiyey, FBK; lit. 'Foundation for combating corruption') is a non-profit organisation established in 2011 by the Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny. The FBK published investigations into alleged corruption by high-ranking Russian government officials.[2] The organisation is funded by private donations.[3]
On 9 October 2019, the FBK was declared a "foreign agent" by the Russian Ministry of Justice.[4][5] On 9 June 2021, the FBK was designated as an "extremist" organisation and liquidated by the Moscow City Court.[6][7] On 11 July 2022, while imprisoned, Navalny announced the relaunch of the FBK as an international organisation.[8] On 27 November 2025, the Russian Supreme Court designated the FBK as a "terrorist organisation".[9]
The European Court of Human Rights and Amnesty International have condemned the Russian Federation's legal actions against ACF and Alexei Navalny, like the designations as "foreign agent", "extremist" and "terrorist", deeming them as politically motivated trial and political and unlawful persecutions.[10][11]
Mission
[edit]FBK Executive Director Vladimir Ashurkov formulated the fund's strategy as pressure on the authorities in order to push them towards internal reforms, working in two directions: organising situations in which government structures will feel pressure, and creating a real alternative to the current power system.[12]
History
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Political activities
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Creation
[edit]FBK was founded by Alexei Navalny.[2] The Foundation was registered on 9 September 2011 (account No. 7714013315, OGRN 1117799018204).[13] According to Vladimir Ashurkov, the founders of the fund gained experience in public and transparent fundraising by organising financing for the RosPil project. A significant amount was collected through the Yandex.Money payment system, which provided financial support for the project for a year. In parallel, the founders of the fund are working on the idea of involving on a permanent basis professional lawyers and economists in the search for and suppression of corruption schemes in the public procurement system. The contractual basis will allow to get some guarantees, in contrast to the scheme for working with volunteers.[12]
Criminal case and "foreign agent" status
[edit]On 3 August 2019, the Investigative Committee of Russia (SKR) opened a criminal case against the FBK, accusing them of laundering ₽1 billion (c. US$15.5 mln).[14] Later the amount was reduced to ₽75 million (c. US$1.15 mln).[4]
On 5 September 2019, searches were conducted at the FBK office and at the "Navalny LIVE" studio.[15]
Soon after the 2019 Moscow City Duma election, on 12 September 2019 the SKR carried out mass raids on the FBK regional offices in 40 Russian cities.[16][17]
In September 2019, various state-owned companies filed lawsuits against FBK for "organising riots", and the courts partially satisfied them in the amount of ₽5 million (c. US$78 000).[18]
On 8 October 2019, the police filed a lawsuit against FBK for "costs of maintaining order during rallies" in the amount of ₽18 million (c. US$280,000).[19]
On 9 October 2019, the FBK was declared a "foreign agent" by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation due to payments from the United States and Spain.[20][4][5] One of these payments was the payment of US$50 made by Yuriy Maslikhov, a Russian citizen residing in the United States. In an interview with journalists, Yuriy Maslikhov stated that he had transferred the money from his PayPal account as an individual and he had been carrying out such donations earlier.[21] Two other payments totalling ₽138,505.41 (c. US$2170) were carried out by Spanish citizen Roberto Fabio Monda Cardenas through CaixaBank on 6 and 17 September 2019. Answering a question of journalists how he, unable to speak Russian, found out the wire payment instructions of the Anti-Corruption Foundation after its removing from official website of the organisation, Roberto Fabio Monda Cardenas was unable to explain.[22] These payments were carried out at a time when the bank account of the Anti-Corruption Foundation was frozen at the request of the Investigative Committee of Russia.[23] Despite the fact that the Anti-Corruption Foundation gave the money back, Ministry of Justice of Russia refused to remove the Anti-Corruption Foundation from the register of "foreign agents".[24]
On 15 October 2019, the SKR again carried out mass raids on the FBK regional offices in 30 Russian cities.[25][26]
Change of legal entity and dissolution
[edit]In February 2019, FBK published an investigation that reported that in December 2018, mass food poisoning of children occurred in kindergartens and schools in Moscow. FBK blamed Concord Food Plant LLC, Moskovskiy Shkolnik LLC and VITO-1 LLC for this, which he linked with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Subsequently, Moscow schools No. 760 and No. 1554 assessed fines against Moskovskiy Shkolnik due to the supply of low-quality food.[citation needed]
In April 2019, Moskovskiy Shkolnik filed a lawsuit against FBK, Navalny, FBK lawyer Lyubov Sobol, who was in charge of the investigation, and its former employee Natalya Shilova, who was involved in the investigation.
In October 2019, the Moscow Arbitration Court ordered Navalny to pay 29.2 million rubles as compensation for lost profits and damage to professional reputation. The court ordered Lyubov Sobol and FBK to pay the same amount. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.
In July 2020, Navalny said that he saw no reason to raise money to pay the "huge amount". He announced that the FBK would be liquidated, and that he and Sobol "until the end of Putin's power" would have to live with blocked accounts and bailiffs seizing any of their property in favour of "Putin's chef". Navalny said that he intended to revive the FBK shortly after as another legal entity.[27][28][29][30][31]
Designation as an "extremist" organisation
[edit]
On 16 April 2021, the Moscow prosecutor office requested the Moscow City Court to declare organisations linked to Navalny including the FBK and his headquarters as "extremist", claiming: "Under the disguise of liberal slogans, these organisations are engaged in creating conditions for the destabilisation of the social and socio-political situation."[32] In response, Navalny aide Leonid Volkov stated: "Putin has just announced full-scale mass political repression in Russia."[33]
On 26 April 2021, the Moscow prosecutor office ordered Navalny's network of regional offices to stop its activities, pending a ruling by the court on whether to designate them and the FBK as "extremist" organisations. The move was condemned by Germany and Amnesty International.[34][35]
On 9 June 2021, Vyacheslav Polyga, judge of Moscow City Court, upheld the administrative claim of the prosecutor of Moscow city Denis Popov and, rejecting all the petitions of the defense, decided[36] to declare the Anti-Corruption Foundation as an "extremist" organisation, to liquidate it and to confiscate its assets; a similar decision had been taken against the Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation; the activity of the Alexei Navalny staff was prohibited (case No.3а-1573/2021).[37] The case hearing was held in camera because, as indicated by advocate Ilia Novikov, the case file including the text of the administrative claim was classified as a state secret.[38] According to advocate Ivan Pavlov, Alexei Navalny was not a party to the proceedings and the judge refused to give him such status; at the hearing, the prosecutor stated that the defendants constitute "extremist" organisations because they want a change of power in Russia and they promised to help participants of the protest with payment of administrative and criminal fines and with making complaints to the European Court of Human Rights.[39][6] On 4 August 2021, First Appellate Ordinary Court located in Moscow upheld the decision of the court of first instance (case No.66а-3553/2021) and this decision entered into force that day.[40] On 28 December 2021, it was reported that Anti-Corruption Foundation, Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation and 18 natural persons including Alexei Navalny filed a cassation appeals to the Second Cassation Ordinary Court.[41] On 25 March 2022, the Second Cassation Ordinary Court rejected all cassation appeals and upheld the judgements of lower courts (case No.8а-5101/2022).[42]
Several members of the organisation, including Lilia Chanysheva (the head of the Ufa branch of the organisation) and Daniel Kholodny (the technical director of the foundation's YouTube channel), were arrested and sentenced to long prison sentences. Memorial considers them political prisoners.[43]
Relaunch as international organisation
[edit]In January 2021, former Russian banker Alexander Zheleznyak registered the international non-profit Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) in the United States.[44]
On 11 July 2022, Navalny announced the relaunch of the FBK as an international organisation with an advisory board including his wife Yulia Navalnaya, Guy Verhofstadt, Anne Applebaum, and Francis Fukuyama; Navalny also stated that the first contribution to Anti-Corruption Foundation International would be the Sakharov Prize ($50,000) that was awarded to him.[8][45] On 4 October, allies of Navalny said they were relaunching his regional network to fight the mobilisation and war, saying it would be a "partisan underground" movement.[46]
On 1 June 2023, the Ministry of Justice added the Anti-Corruption Foundation International to the list of "undesirable organisations"; earlier in December 2022, the ACF International was declared a "foreign agent".[47]
After the death of Navalny in a Russian prison in February 2024, his wife Yulia Navalnaya leads the organisation.[48]
On 15 April 2025, Russia sentenced four journalists (Antonina Favorskaya, Konstantin Gabov, Sergei Karelin, and Artem Kriger) to five and a half years in a penal colony. Prosecutors accused the four of producing material for the Anti-Corruption Foundation's YouTube channel.[49]
On 22 October 2025, the Prosecutor General's Office petitioned the Supreme Court of Russia to designate the ACF as a "terrorist organisation".[50] On 27 November 2025, the court designated the ACF as a "terrorist organisation".[51]
Notable investigations
[edit]2013
[edit]- Investigation of Vyacheslav Volodin, Sergey Neverov and other members of the United Russia party[52]
- Investigation of Vladimir Yakunin, ex-RZD[53]
- Investigation of Vladimir Pekhtin, MP[54]
- Investigation of Sergey Sobyanin, Mayor of Moscow[55]
- Investigation of Viacheslav Fetisov, member of the Federation Council, former ice hockey player[56]
2014
[edit]- Investigation of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his son Igor Lebedev, both members of parliament[57]
- Investigation of Viktor Khristenko and his wife Tatyana Golikova, who were both in government[58]
- Investigation affairs of Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Romanovich Rotenberg[59]
- Investigation of Anton Drozdov, who was in charge of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation[60]
2015
[edit]- Chaika – film documenting the investigation of Prosecutor General of Russia Yury Chaika and his sons[61]
- Investigation of Sergey Shoygu, Minister of Defence[62]
- Investigation of Dmitry Peskov, press attaché to Vladimir Putin[63]
- Investigation of Vladimir Yakunin and his son (addition)
- Investigation of Mikhail Kusnirovich
- Investigation of Roman Abramovich
- Investigation of Gennady Timchenko
- Investigation of Night Wolves (a motorcycle club under Putin's patronage)
- Investigation of Viacheslav Fetisov, member of the Federation Council, former ice hockey player (addition)
2016
[edit]- Investigation of Vyacheslav Volodin, Sergey Neverov and other members of the United Russia party
- Investigation of a General of the FSB right on the border
- Investigation of Yevgeny Prigozhin, chief of Web brigades and Trolls from Olgino (Russia's governmental troll army)
- Investigation of Petr Kolbin, friend and secret purse[clarification needed] of Vladimir Putin
- Investigation of Igor Sechin's wife
- Investigation of Nikolay Merkushkin, governor of Samara Oblast
- Investigation of Igor Shuvalov, First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia
- Investigation of Maxim Liksutov in the case of Sergei Magnitsky
- Investigation of Viktor Zolotov, Director of the National Guard of Russia
- Investigation of Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, in charge of the defense industry
- Investigation of Aleksandr Sidyakin, member of parliament
- Investigation of Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Prime Minister[64]
2017
[edit]- He Is Not Dimon to You – investigation of Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev
2018
[edit]- Investigation of Sergei Prikhodko, First Deputy Head of the Russian Government Office
2019
[edit]- Investigation of Andrey Metelsky, the deputy of the Moscow City Duma
- Investigation of Lyudmila Stebenkova, the deputy of the Moscow City Duma
- Investigation of Stepan Orlov, the deputy of the Moscow City Duma
- Investigation of Kirill Shchitov, the deputy of the Moscow City Duma
- Investigation of Alexei Shaposhnikov, the chairman of the Moscow City Duma
- Investigation of Vladimir Platonov, the former chairman of the Moscow City Duma
- Investigation of Natalya Sergunina, the vice-mayor of Moscow
- Investigation of Alexander Gorbenko, the vice-mayor of Moscow
- Investigation of Pyotr Biryukov, the vice-mayor of Moscow
- Investigation of Valentin Gorbunov, the head of the MCEC
- Investigation of Boris Ebzeev, member of the CEC
- Investigation of Nikolay Bulaev, the vice-chairman of the CEC
- Investigation of Anton Siluanov, Russian Minister of Finance
2021
[edit]- A Palace for Putin. The Story of the Biggest Bribe – investigation of President Vladimir Putin
- Investigation of Sergey Lavrov[65]
2022
[edit]- Yacht Scheherazade – investigation of President Vladimir Putin[66][67]
Financing
[edit]FBK is funded by money transfers from its supporters; mostly these are donations from ordinary people.[68] According to Ashurkov, "constant fundraising is a necessary condition for the functioning" of the fund. The creators want to build a system that will allow the fund "not to depend on one source of funding". In April 2012, the creators estimated the fund's annual budget at approximately $300,000. If more funds are available, the fund will expand.[12]
In 2013, the fund raised 23 million rubles through donations.[69] In 2014 the budget was 28.5 million rubles;[70] in 2016, it was 45 million rubles.[71]
First public sponsors
[edit]The first public sponsors of the fund on 13 February 2012 were the son of the founder of PJSC VimpelCom, businessman Boris Zimin (confirmed that he had already given 300,000 rubles and will give about the same amount every month) and former manager of Alfa Group Vladimir Ashurkov (confirmed that gave 300,000 rubles). On 30 May 2012, the list of the first 16 sponsors of the fund was announced:[72][73]
| № | Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Vladimir Ashurkov | Executive director of the Fund |
| 2 | Roman Borisovich | Vice President of Rosgosstrakh LLC |
| 3 | Dmitry Bykov | Writer |
| 4 | Sergey Grechishkin | Managing Partner, Alcantara Asset Management |
| 5 | Sergey Guriyev | Former rector of the New Economic School |
| 6 | Ekaterina Zhuravskaya | Professor at the Paris School of Economics and the New Economic School |
| 7 | Boris Zimin | Entrepreneur |
| 8 | Kirill Irtyuga | Partner of RosinvestHotel Management Company |
| 9 | Alexander Lebedev | Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Reserve Corporation |
| 10 | Artyom Lyubimov | First Deputy General Director of Bolshoi Gorod CJSC (accounting services) |
| 11 | Leonid Parfyonov | Journalist |
| 12 | Pavel Prosyankin | Financier |
| 13 | Alexey Savchenko | Director for Strategic Planning, Alfa Group Consortium |
| 14 | Denis Sokolov | Entrepreneur |
| 15 | Victor Yarutov | Businessman, co-owner of the Nienschanz Group of Companies |
| 16 | Boris Akunin | Writer |
According to Navalny, "they have already transferred 4.4 million rubles, and guaranteed another 4 million for the second half of the year", which provides most of the planned annual budget of the fund ($300,000).[72]
According to Vladimir Ashurkov and Navalny, the negotiations took place for three months, and some of those with whom they took place eventually decided to refrain from making contributions to the fund. However, many of those who ended up supporting the project, despite not being bound by any contractual obligations, promised to make regular donations. This allows to plan the activities of the fund. In case of an increase in voluntary contributions, it is planned to develop the staff of the fund's projects, giving a special role to the anti-corruption "RosPil". Moreover, all business representatives support the fund financially as individuals.[72]
According to Navalny, in order to help potential donors decide to support the fund and similar projects, the first of those who have already done so will announce their names.[72] And Vladimir Ashurkov suggested that later the names of those who financially support the fund will not be made public, except for cases when the donors themselves ask for it.[72] Ashurkov said that Alfa Group's top manager Alexei Savchenko appeared on the list of sponsors thanks to his acquaintance with him.[72] Navalny noted that the fund has no other sponsors from Alpha.[72] Political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky noted the interest of representatives of big business in the opposition, highlighting Mikhail Fridman.[72]
As a funding strategy for the fund, Navalny stated the collection of small donations, but with the involvement of a wide range of donors, emphasising the importance of mass support.[74]
Team
[edit].jpg)
Current leadership
[edit]| Position[75] | Name |
|---|---|
| Founder of FBK | Alexey Navalny |
| Director of FBK | Vladislav Romantsov |
| Executive manager | Vladimir Ashurkov |
| Press secretary | Kira Yarmysh |
| Creative director | Varvara Mikhaylova |
| Head of the legal department | Vyacheslav Gimadi |
| "Navalny Live" YouTube channel producer | Lyubov Sobol |
| Anti-corruption project "RosPil" | Alexander Golovach |
| Anti-corruption project "RosYama" | Anatoly Kravchenko |
| Head of Investigation Department | Maria Pevchikh |
| Deputy Head of Investigation Department | Georgy Alburov |
| Head of IT department | Vladislav Romantsov |
Team members
[edit]The FBK project managers are Ruslan Shaveddinov, Ilya Pakhomov. The legal department includes: Alexander Pomazuev, Vladlen Los, Evgeny Zamyatin. Valery Zolotukhin is also involved in the RosPil project. In addition, the team includes video production manager Vitaly Kolesnikov, mailing list manager Yan Matveyev, editor Maria Zakharova, office manager Olga Bulaeva.[75]
The director of the fund from 2013 to December 2018 was Roman Rubanov. Since December 2018, the head of the legal department of the fund, Ivan Zhdanov, has been appointed director.[76]
Since February 2012, the executive director of the fund has been Vladimir Ashurkov, who was forced to leave Alfa Group to work at FBK.[12][77]
Media
[edit]FBK created its own media, 'Leviathan', in order to have a possibility to register for press conferences of Vladimir Putin and make a request to authorities. Since 2016 it has been publishing one news item per day.[78] The name 'Leviathan' was taken from Leviathan, 2014 award-winning film by Andrey Zvyagintsev.
Films
[edit]FBK has made the following films:
- Chaika, 2015 film about corruption of Prosecutor General of Russia Yury Chaika;
- He Is Not Dimon to You, 2017 film about umpteen properties used by Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev.
- Yachts, oligarchs, girls: a hunter for men exposes a bribe taker, 2018 film about informal relations between Russian businessman Oleg Deripaska and member of the Russian government Sergei Prikhodko, as well as possible sexual relations between Sergei Prikhodko and an employee of the escort agency Anastasia Vashukevich.
- Putin's Palace (2021)
See also
[edit]- 2019 Moscow City Duma election
- 2019 Moscow protests
- 2021 Russian protests
- Corruption in Russia
- Smart Voting (Russia)
- Transparency International Russia
References
[edit]- ^ https://www.svoboda.org/a/fbk-posle-otstavki-leonida-volkova-vozglavila-mariya-pevchih/32329728.html Archived 22 March 2023 at the Wayback Machine ФБК после отставки Леонида Волкова возглавила Мария Певчих
- ^ a b Henry Foy; Aime Williams (10 June 2021). "Russia outlaws Alexei Navalny's organisations as 'extremist'". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 29 March 2022.
- ^ "Navalny ally urges donors to use cryptocurrency due to crackdown". Reuters. 2 June 2021. Archived from the original on 2 June 2021. Retrieved 29 March 2022.
- ^ a b c Mukhametshina, Elena; Krechetova, Angelina; Chunova, Alexandra (10 October 2019). "Признание ФБК иностранным агентом призвано затруднить его участие в политике" [FBK's recognition as a foreign agent is intended to hinder its participation in politics]. Vedomosti. Archived from the original on 10 October 2019. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ a b "Russia brands opposition leader Navalny anti-corruption group a 'foreign agent'". Deutsche Welle. 9 October 2019. Archived from the original on 9 October 2019. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ a b "Russia Blacklists Navalny's Political and Activist Movements as 'Extremist'". The Moscow Times. 9 June 2021. Archived from the original on 9 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
- ^ "Мосгорсуд признал ФБК экстремистской организацией" [The Moscow City Court recognized the FBK as an extremist organization]. dw.com. 9 June 2021. Archived from the original on 30 October 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
- ^ a b "Navalny Announces Launch Of New Anti-Corruption Foundation". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 11 July 2022. Archived from the original on 11 July 2022. Retrieved 21 August 2022.
- ^ "Russia Labels Navalny's Anti-Corruption Group as Terrorist Organization". The New York Times. 27 November 2025. Retrieved 1 December 2025.
- ^ "Russia: Move to label Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation a "terrorist organization" puts thousands in danger".
- ^ "ECHR rules Russia's persecution of Navalny and his supporters unlawful and politically motivated".
- ^ a b c d Badanin, Roman; Osipov, Ivan (25 April 2012). ""Я понимал, что сотрудничество с Навальным может быть угрозой для моей работы"" [I understood that cooperation with Navalny could be a threat to my work]. Forbes. Retrieved 16 December 2020.
- ^ "Портал государственных услуг" [Government services portal]. unro.minjust.ru. 15 December 2020. Archived from the original on 11 April 2013. Retrieved 16 December 2020.
- ^ Gubenko, Artyom (3 August 2019). "СК возбудил дело об отмывании ФБК Навального 1 млрд руб" [The Investigative Committee opened a case on the laundering of FBK Navalny 1 billion rubles]. RBK Group. Archived from the original on 3 August 2019. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ "Силовики в ФБК, в офисе 'Навальный Live' и в московском штабе политика" [Security officials at FBK, at the Navalny Live office and at the politician's Moscow headquarters]. MediaZona (in Russian). 9 September 2019. Archived from the original on 16 October 2019. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ "Суд разрешил провести еще 47 обысков по делу ФБК" [The court allowed 47 more searches in the FBK case]. Kommersant (in Russian). 17 September 2019. Archived from the original on 26 September 2019. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ Bennetts, Marc (12 September 2019). "Russian police carry out mass raids against opposition activists". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ "Суд вернул компании по аренде автомобилей иск к ФБК на 1 млрд рублей" [The court returned the car rental company a claim against FBK for 1 billion rubles]. Vedomosti (in Russian). 16 October 2019. Archived from the original on 22 October 2019. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ "Полиция Москвы решила отсудить у оппозиции 18 млн рублей" [Moscow police decided to sue the opposition for 18 million rubles]. Interfax (in Russian). 8 October 2019. Archived from the original on 26 July 2021. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ Dergachev, Vladimir (9 October 2019). "Минюст объявил фонд Алексея Навального иностранным агентом" [Ministry of Justice declares Alexey Navalny's fund a foreign agent]. RBK (in Russian). Archived from the original on 25 July 2021. Retrieved 16 July 2021.
- ^ "'Это всё была провокация': интервью 'американского спонсора' Навального" ['It was all a provocation': interview with 'American sponsor' Navalny]. Openmedia.io (in Russian). 12 October 2019. Archived from the original on 12 October 2019. Retrieved 16 July 2021.
- ^ Kovalev, Alexey (18 October 2019). "'Медуза' нашла испанца, из-за которого ФБК признали 'иностранным агентом'. Он не может объяснить, зачем помогал российским борцам с коррупцией" [Meduza found a Spaniard who caused the FBK to be recognized as a "foreign agent". He cannot explain why he helped Russian corruption fighters]. Meduza (in Russian). Archived from the original on 18 October 2019. Retrieved 16 July 2021.
- ^ Davydov, Viktor; Belyaeva, Nadezhda (8 August 2019). "В ФБК провели обыски и арестовали счета по делу об отмывании денег. Сумма 'легализованных средств' снизилась с миллиарда до 75 миллионов рублей" [The FBK was searched and arrested accounts in the case of money laundering. The amount of 'legalized funds' has decreased from a billion to 75 million rubles]. Meduza (in Russian). Archived from the original on 25 April 2022. Retrieved 16 July 2021.
- ^ "Минюст отказался исключить ФБК из реестра 'иностранных агентов'" [Ministry of Justice refused to remove FBK from the register of 'foreign agents']. Meduza (in Russian). 25 December 2020. Archived from the original on 16 July 2021. Retrieved 16 July 2021.
- ^ "СКР сообщил об обысках по делу ФБК в 30 городах" [Investigative Committee of Russia reported about searches in the FBK case in 30 cities]. Interfax (in Russian). 15 October 2019. Archived from the original on 15 October 2019. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ Walker, Shaun (15 October 2019). "Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny condemns mass raids". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 28 October 2019.
- ^ "Московская школа выиграла иск на 1,5 млн рублей из-за поставок некачественной еды" [The Moscow school won a lawsuit for 1.5 million rubles for the supply of low-quality food]. Interfax (in Russian). 4 April 2019. Archived from the original on 2 June 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
- ^ Duryagina, Kira (29 October 2019). "Иск подают холодным" [The claim is served cold]. Kommersant. Archived from the original on 2 August 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
- ^ Rozhkova, Elena; Glukhova, Natalia (21 July 2020). "Алексей Навальный изменился в юрлице" [Alexey Navalny has changed in the legal entity]. Kommersant. Archived from the original on 14 August 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
- ^ Kalyukov, Evgeny (28 October 2019). "Навальный сообщил о взыскании ₽88 млн в пользу 'Московского школьника'" [Navalny announced the recovery of ₽88 million in favour of the "Moscow Schoolboy"]. RBK Group (in Russian). Archived from the original on 22 July 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
- ^ "Навальный объявил о закрытии ФБК. Вместо фонда создадут новую организацию" [Navalny announced the closure of FBK. A new organization will be created instead of the foundation]. BBC Russian Service (in Russian). 20 July 2020. Archived from the original on 20 July 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2020.
- ^ Levchenko, Grigoriy (16 April 2021). "Прокуратура потребовала признать ФБК экстремистской организацией" [The prosecutor's office demanded to recognize the FBK as an extremist organization]. Meduza (in Russian). Archived from the original on 17 April 2021. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
- ^ Clark, Anastasia (16 April 2021). "Russian Prosecutors Seek to Label Navalny Groups as 'Extremist'". The Moscow Times. Archived from the original on 16 April 2021. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
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External links
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